As part of the ongoing series of posts demonstrating the dubious value of Ms. Lithwick's commentary to anybody in search of intelligent argument, here is another example.
As recently as last year, in the course of belittling Ms. O'Donnell's Senate candidacy, Ms. Lithwick—informedly, a law school graduate—deemed it advised to mock as "weird" the candidates views:
I have been fascinated by Christine O'Donnell's constitutional worldview since her debate with her opponent Chris Coons last week. O'Donnell explained that "when I go to Washington, D.C., the litmus test by which I cast my vote for every piece of legislation that comes across my desk will be whether or not it is constitutional." How weird is that, I thought. Isn't it a court's job to determine whether or not something is, in fact, constitutional? And isn't that sort of provided for in, well, the Constitution?
Decoding Christine O'Donnell, Slate (Sept. 22, 2010).
Setting aside the question of whether a bill's constitutionality should be the sole basis for a legislator's vote—surely there must be constitutional yet inadvisable bills: let's say incorporating Mickey Mouse into the flag of the United States?—it hardly seems remarkable that a legislator, who has sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution, should at least give some thought to the issue before voting.
But then Ms. Lithwick deemed any such legislative cogitation to be no less than in violation of the Constitution itself. Now, however, Ms. Lithwick informs us of the opposite conclusion, bewailing the fact that:
Gone are the days in which legislatures at least attempted to ensure state regulations conformed to the broadest interpretation of the Roe constraints.
The Death of Roe v. Wade, Slate (April 19, 2011).
So it appears to be Ms. Lithwick's position that it is weird and unconstitutional for legislators to consider whether the bills they are voting on are in violation of the Constitution itself, but a necessity for law makers to only advance bills which are in full conformance of recent and controversial Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution.
If there is any rational basis for Ms. Lithwick's position other than a complete and unprincipled disregard for the Constitution except when useful as a stick to beat upon political opponents, it escapes this author.
